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  1. Countering Terrorism
  2. There are currently more than 1500 terrorist
  3. organizations and groups being monitored in the United
  4. States. Terrorists by definition kill people and
  5. destroy property in order to advance a political
  6. agenda. We must make every effort to protect American
  7. citizens from these attacks. In the future that will
  8. require both state of the art measures to monitor
  9. terrorist activities and the movement of materials
  10. used for these activities, but also response scenarios
  11. in the event of an actual incident. The United States
  12. has consistently set a good example of no negotiations
  13. with terrorists and attempting to bring alleged
  14. terrorists to trial. We need to support humanitarian,
  15. political, and educational efforts to decrease the
  16. incidence of terrorism across the world. That includes
  17. measures to eliminate the production and deployment of
  18. nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. We need to
  19. maintain a high level of vigilance to protect the
  20. security of the United States.
  21. The FBI is the lead agency in the the fight against
  22. terrorism. This FBI has been very effective in
  23. coordinating the efforts of other agencies. They have
  24. been successful in finding the perpetrators of
  25. terrorist activity and preventing many terrorist
  26. incidents. The problem is that no federal agency can
  27. be expected to find all of the terrorists, before they
  28. commit violent crimes. The bombing incidents at the
  29. World Trade Center and Oklahoma City are two examples.
  30. In both of these incidents, conventional explosives
  31. technology was used to kill people and destroy
  32. property. There are current efforts coordinated by the
  33. FBI to obtain intelligence on the groups that would
  34. use these methods and intercept them before the
  35. incidents occur. These incidents will continue to
  36. require concerted efforts by national and
  37. international law enforcement agencies. But there are
  38. possible incidents that could lead to greater loss of
  39. life. Those incidents would occur if terrorists used
  40. biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.
  41. Bioterrorism
  42. Bioterrorism is using biological warfare agents to
  43. commit terrorist crimes. There are various estimates
  44. of the effects of terrorists releasing various
  45. biological weapons on an unsuspecting population. The
  46. Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian
  47. Biodefense suggest that the three most likely
  48. biological agents that could be used include smallpox,
  49. anthrax, and plague. There are several other bacteria,
  50. viruses, and biological toxins that are also
  51. considered candidates for biological warfare or
  52. terrorism. On October 1, 1999 Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, a
  53. former Soviet military officer who was second in
  54. command of their biological weapons division appeared
  55. on ABC News Prime Time Live. He had defected from the
  56. Soviet Union in 1992. He wrote a classified report at
  57. that time that this program had produced hundreds of
  58. tons of anthrax and several tons of small pox virus
  59. and plague bacteria. He said that the Russians were
  60. continuing to actively work on biological weapons.
  61. This allegation was subsequently denied by Russian
  62. officials. The most significant threat from biological
  63. weapons currently has to do with the security of the
  64. Russian supply of these materials. Because these
  65. weapons are inexpensive to produce and deploy there
  66. are concerns that they may be the agents of choice for
  67. some states that sponsor terrorist activity. The World
  68. Health Organization has estimated the lethality of
  69. these weapons. The lethality of smallpox, anthrax, and
  70. plague are given in the table below:
  71. Agent
  72. Case Fatality Rate
  73. Treatment and Prevention
  74. Smallpox
  75. 30%
  76. Vaccination
  77. Anthrax
  78. 80%
  79. Vaccination, Antibiotics
  80. Plague
  81. 50%
  82. Vaccination, Antibiotics
  83. The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has concluded
  84. that of the total number of known biological agents
  85. only a few would be suitable as weapons of mass
  86. destruction. Various estimates about the lethality of
  87. these agents are available. A 1993 report by the
  88. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
  89. estimates that an aircraft release of 50 pounds of
  90. anthrax spores over a large metropolitan area would
  91. result in 130,000 to 3 million deaths. This is the
  92. same magnitude of the expected casualties expected in
  93. a nuclear attack. The main problem in the case of a
  94. biological weapon attack is recognition of the illness
  95. and taking the appropriate treatment measures. Some of
  96. the symptom presentations are difficult to figure out,
  97. and any delay in diagnosis can lead to further poor
  98. outcomes and further spread of the illness. If the
  99. attack is not announced, the only early sign may be a
  100. large increase in serious respiratory disease in a
  101. community.
  102. Nuclear Terrorism
  103. Nuclear terrorism is a consequence of nuclear
  104. proliferation and advanced technology. As early as
  105. 1980, the Soviet Union and the United States produced
  106. working suitcase sized nuclear weapons that could be
  107. used for the purpose of terrorism. The United States
  108. subsequently disposed of these weapons. Dr. Alexie
  109. Yablokov gave testimony to the Research and
  110. Development Subcommittee in 1997 and asserted that
  111. these suitcase bombs exist and that many were
  112. unaccounted for. The Committee Chairman,
  113. Representative Curt Weldon said that in other contacts
  114. as many as 132 of these devices were built in Russia
  115. and that only 48 could be located. There was some
  116. controversy about the health effects of dispersing
  117. plutonium into the water supply or air, rather than
  118. using it for weapons. The main problem that any
  119. terrorist group would have is getting plutonium to
  120. produce a weapon. There are currently nine countries
  121. that stockpile weapons grade plutonium. They hold
  122. approximately 250 Tons of this material. The largest
  123. supplies are thought to be in Israel and India. It
  124. takes about 3-4 kg of plutonium to produce a nuclear
  125. warhead. This stock can produce about 80,000 nuclear
  126. weapons.
  127. The real current danger in terms of the nuclear threat
  128. of terrorist suitcase bombs is the availability of
  129. weapons grade plutonium to terrorists. It is estimated
  130. that a few kilograms of this material could be
  131. purchased on the black market for several million
  132. dollars. There are rumors that attempts to make these
  133. purchases have already occurred. The availability of
  134. plutonium for sale to terrorist organizations also
  135. depends on the stability of a country's economy. It is
  136. thought that a destabilized economy increases the
  137. likelihood of a transaction with terrorists. To
  138. directly deal with this threat, Congress has initiated
  139. and maintained various program since 1991 to assist
  140. Russia in providing adequate security to nuclear
  141. materials, assist in dismantling weapons that were not
  142. necessary for its defense, assisting in converting
  143. reactors from plutonium production to power
  144. generation, and providing funding to research
  145. facilities so that nuclear scientists and technicians
  146. would not emigrate to other countries and provide
  147. assistance in nuclear weapons technology. These
  148. provisions are known as Nunn-Lugar after the senators
  149. who sponsored the initial bill. They are also known as
  150. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs.
  151. What Can Be Done at This Time
  152. While researching this issue, I frequently came across
  153. expert opinion that: It is not a question of if, but
  154. when terrorists will attack using some of these
  155. weapons. In spite of this level of concern by the
  156. experts there are no visible initiatives at the state
  157. and community level. In my opinion those initiatives
  158. should include education and organization around
  159. prevention and response to terrorist attacks. There
  160. should also be more information available on the
  161. importance of nuclear non-proliferation and assisting
  162. Russia with improving the security of its nuclear
  163. stockpiles and expert personnel. I would work on the
  164. following anti-terrorism agenda if elected:
  165. 1. Rigorous support for Nunn-Lugar or CTR programs:
  166. Preventing terrorist organizations from getting
  167. nuclear material that could be incorporated into a
  168. small device and imported into the United States is a
  169. priority. The best chance we have to do this is to
  170. assist Russian in dismantling their offensive nuclear
  171. weapons and supporting research by their current
  172. nuclear scientists into other areas. These programs
  173. have many documented successes, and the potential cost
  174. is too high if we become less vigilant in this area.
  175. There are signs that we are becoming less willing to
  176. fund some of these measures. For example, the
  177. installation of radiation detectors at all of Russia's
  178. border locations would cost several billion dollars.
  179. Instead we have pledged a few million dollars, or
  180. enough to put detectors at a few key locations. We
  181. clearly need more resolve in this area. Another
  182. possible advantage of these programs may be new ideas
  183. on how to reduce and contain chemical and biological
  184. weapons.
  185. 2. Halting Production of Enriched Uranium and
  186. Plutonium:
  187. Both of these elements can be used to build nuclear
  188. weapons. The best way to assure more safety for the
  189. United States and the rest of the planet is to press
  190. for the cessation of the production of enriched
  191. Uranium and Plutonium.
  192. 3. Support for Recommendations by the Working Group on
  193. Civilian Biodefense:
  194. In the initial papers written by this group they
  195. emphasize the need for increased medical awareness and
  196. knowledge of these organisms and toxins. They also
  197. prioritize more rapid diagnostic techniques, and
  198. better knowledge about therapy, infection control, and
  199. decontamination strategies. Where it is needed they
  200. also recommend improved vaccines and increased
  201. stockpiles and production capacities of the specific
  202. vaccine. In the case of certain bacteria, antibiotic
  203. resistance has been demonstrated in the same organisms
  204. used for weapons. The Working Group recommends further
  205. study of this resistance phenomenon.
  206. 4. Local Experts and Treatment Protocols:
  207. The knowledge of what to do in a terrorist attack that
  208. potentially involves weapons of mass destruction
  209. currently exists in a few specialized facilities in
  210. the country. This expertise needs to be disseminated
  211. to local multidisciplinary teams and members of the
  212. medical community. These groups need access to the
  213. latest specialized information and potential hazards.
  214. If elected, I will work very hard in this area to make
  215. sure Minnesota has the local experts and they in turn
  216. have access to the information they need to respond to
  217. terrorist threats and actions.
  218. 5. Support for Current Counter Terrorism Efforts:
  219. The FBI is currently the lead agency for these
  220. efforts. They have been successful in intercepting
  221. terrorists in this country and tracking down
  222. terrorists who have completed an act of violence. An
  223. active dialogue between this agency and Congress is
  224. needed to make sure that this agency has the resources
  225. and cooperation it needs to be effective in this area.
  226. 6. Preventive measures to Reduce the Risk of a
  227. Successful Attack:
  228. The current public literature and commentary describes
  229. a high risk of attack in the next 25 years. So far
  230. there has been very little discussion of what citizens
  231. can do to prevent attacks and protect their families
  232. and communities. This discussion has to occur. I do
  233. not believe we can focus only on how to manage the
  234. consequences of an attack after it has occurred. This
  235. is an opportunity for involvement by all citizens. If
  236. elected, I will push for these strategies and
  237. encourage their dissemination to all citizens.
  238. All of these measures are important priorities because
  239. of the risks inherent in not paying attention to these
  240. threats.
  241. <br><br><b>Bibliography</b><br><br>:
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  247. infectious diseases: public health issues for the 21st
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  249. 4. Biological Weapons FAQ v 0.44
  250. 5. Diakov A, Goodby J. Minding nuclear fences. IEEE
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  252. 6. Feivson H, Blair B. How to lengthen the nuclear
  253. fuse. IEEE Spectrum 2000; 37:40-43.
  254. 7. Forden G, Podvig P, Postol T. False alarm, nuclear
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  256. 8. Franz DR, Zajtchuk R. Biological terrorism:
  257. understanding the threat, preparation, and medical
  258. response. Disease-a-Month 2000; 46: 125-192.
  259. 9. Henderson D. The looming threat of bioterrorism.
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  261. 10. Henderson D, Inglesby T, Bartlett J, et al.
  262. Smallpox as a biological weapon: medical and public
  263. health management. JAMA 1999; 281:2127-37.
  264. 11. Inglesby T, Henderson D, Bartlett J, et al.
  265. Anthrax as a biological weapon: medical and public
  266. health management. JAMA 1999; 281:1735-45.
  267. 12. Marwick C. Scary scenarios spark action at
  268. bioterrorism symposium. JAMA 1999; 281:1071-73.
  269. 13. Mosher D, Bukharin O, Perry T. Minding Russia's
  270. nuclear store. IEEE Spectrum 2000; 37:44-50.
  271. 14. Stimson Center. Chemical and Biological Weapons
  272. Nonproliferation Project
  273. 15. Sweet W, Kumagai J. The troubling state of nuclear
  274. controls. IEEE Spectrum 2000; 37:28-30.
  275. 16. Additional Bioterrorism and Biological Warfare
  276. Links
  277. <br><br>
  278. Words: 2025