mul6.txt 7.6 KB

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  1. Banking
  2. So Much for That Plan
  3. More than 70% of commercial bank assets are held by organizations that are
  4. supervised by at least two federal agencies; almost half attract the attention
  5. of three or four. Banks devote on average about 14% of their non-interest
  6. expense to complying with rules (Anonymous 88). A fool can see that
  7. government waste has struck again. This tangled mess of regulation, among
  8. other things, increases costs and diffuses accountability for policy actions
  9. gone awry. The most effective remedy to correct this problem would be to
  10. consolidate most of the supervisory responsibilities of the regulatory agencies
  11. into one agency. This would reduce costs to both the government and the
  12. banks, and would allow the parts of the agencies not consolidated to
  13. concentrate on their primary tasks. One such plan was introduced by
  14. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen in March of 1994. The plan called for
  15. folding, into a new independent federal agency (called the Banking
  16. Commission), the regulatory portions of the Office of the Comptroller of the
  17. Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
  18. Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). This plan
  19. would save the government $150 to $200 million a year. This would also allow
  20. the FDIC to concentrate on deposit insurance and the Fed to concentrate on
  21. monetary policy (Anonymous 88). Of course this is Washington, not The
  22. Land of Oz, so everyone can't be satisfied with this plan. Fed Chairman Alan
  23. Greenspan and FDIC Chairman Ricki R. Tigert have been vocal opponents of
  24. the plan. Greenspan has four major complaints about the plan. First, divorced
  25. from the banks, the Fed would find it harder to forestall and deal with
  26. financial crises. Second, monetary policy would suffer because the Fed would
  27. have less access to review the banks. Thirdly, a supervisor with no
  28. macroeconomic concerns might be too inclined to discourage banks from
  29. taking risks, slowing the economy down. Lastly, creating a single regulator
  30. would do away with important checks and balances, in the process damaging
  31. state bank regulation (Anonymous 88). To answer these criticisms it is
  32. necessary to make clear what the Fed's job is. The Fed has three main
  33. responsibilities: to ensure financial stability, to implement monetary policy, and
  34. to oversee a smoothly functioning payments system (delivering checks and
  35. transferring funds) (Syron 3). The responsibilities of the Fed are linked to the
  36. banking system. For the Fed to carry out its job it must have detailed
  37. knowledge of the working of banks and financial markets. Central banks
  38. know from the experience of financial crises that regulatory and monetary
  39. policy directly influence each other. For example, a banking crises can disturb
  40. monetary policy, discouraging lending and destroying consumer confidence,
  41. they can also disrupt the ability to make or receive payments by check or to
  42. transfer funds. It is for these reasons that it is argued that the Fed must
  43. maintain a regulatory role with banks. The Treasury plan would leave the Fed
  44. some access to the review of banks. The Fed, which lends through its
  45. discount window and operates an interbank money transfer system, would
  46. have full access to bank examination data. Because regulatory policy affects
  47. monetary policy and systemic risk, it is necessary that the Fed have at least
  48. some jurisdiction. The Fed must be able to effectively deal with current policy
  49. concerns. The Banking Commission would be mainly concerned with the
  50. safety and stability of the banks. This would encourage conservative
  51. regulations, and could inhibit economic growth. The Fed clearly has a hands
  52. on knowledge of the banking system. The common indicators of monetary
  53. policy - the monetary aggregates, the federal funds rate, and the growth of
  54. loans - are all influenced by bank behavior and bank regulation.
  55. Understanding changes and taking action in a timely fashion can be achieved
  56. only by maintaining contact with examiners who are directly monitoring
  57. banks (Syron 7). The banking system is what ultimately determines monetary
  58. policy. It is only common sense to have personnel in the Fed that have a
  59. better understanding of the system other than just through financial
  60. statements and examination reports. The Fed also needs the authority to
  61. change bank behavior that is inconsistent with its established monetary policy
  62. and with financial stability. This requires both the responsibility for writing the
  63. regulations and the responsibility for enforcing those regulations through bank
  64. supervision. State banking charters have already started to be affected.
  65. Under the proposed plan, state chartered banks would be subject to two
  66. regulators. While the federal bank would have only one. Thus, making the
  67. state bank charter less attractive. However, an increasing number of banks
  68. are opting for state supervision. It turns out that many banks are afraid of
  69. losing existing freedoms, or of failing to gain new ones, if supervision is
  70. centralized. State regulators have given their banks more freedom than
  71. federal ones: 17 now permit banks to sell insurance (and five to underwrite it,
  72. 23 allow them to operate discount stockbrokers and a handful even let them
  73. run estate agencies (Anonymous 91). The FDIC has two main criticisms of
  74. the Treasury's plan. First, FDIC Chairman Tigert believes that it is very
  75. important that there be checks and balances in the system going forward
  76. (Cocheo 43). Second, Tigert believes that, since the FDIC is the one who
  77. writes the checks for bank failures, the FDIC should be allowed to keep its
  78. independence. It is necessary to maintain the checks and balances of
  79. different agencies. This separation is necessary because of the differences in
  80. examinations of the different regulatory agencies with respect to the same
  81. institutions. It is important that the independent [deposit] insurer have access
  82. to information that's available not only through reporting requirements, but
  83. also through on-site examinations (Cocheo 43). Tigert explains that the FDIC
  84. must keep backup examination authority. As well as maintain the ability to
  85. conduct on-site examinations of all institutions it insures, not just the
  86. state-chartered nonmember banks it supervises directly. She agrees with
  87. those who say there is no need for duplicative examinations, but insists FDIC
  88. must be able to look at institutions whose condition or activities have changed
  89. drastically enough to be of concern to the insurer. While consolidation of the
  90. bank supervisory process is overdue, issues of bank supervision and
  91. regulation affect the entire economy. There is no way to tell what is in store
  92. for banking regulation in the future. It is known, however, that we must
  93. beware that all the regulatory agencies in place now, are in place for a
  94. reason. Careful thought and debate must be undertaken before any reform is
  95. made. In the end, Americans seem no more inclined to tolerate concentration
  96. among regulators than they are among banks.
  97. <br><br><b>Bibliography</b><br><br>
  98. Anonymous. American Bank Regulation: Four Into One Can Go. The
  99. Economist 330 (March 5, 1994): 88-91.
  100. Cocheo, Steve. Declaration of Independence. ABA Banking Journal 87
  101. (February 1995): 43-48.
  102. Syron, Richard F. The Fed Must Continue to Supervise Banks. New
  103. England Economic Review (January/February 1994): 3-8.
  104. Works Consulted
  105. Anonymous. Banking Bill Spells Regulatory Relief. Savings & Community
  106. Banker 3 (September 1994): 8-9.
  107. Broaddus, J. Alfred Jr. Choices in Banking Policy. Economic Quarterly
  108. (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond) 80 (Spring 1994): 1-9.
  109. Reinicke, Wolfgang H. Consolidation of Federal Bank Regulation?
  110. Challenge 37 (May/June 1994): 23-29.
  111. <br><br>
  112. Words: 1210