123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229230231 |
- /* Linux host-specific hook definitions.
- Copyright (C) 2004-2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- This file is part of GCC.
- GCC is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
- by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3, or (at your
- option) any later version.
- GCC is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
- ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
- License for more details.
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with GCC; see the file COPYING3. If not see
- <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
- #include "config.h"
- #include "system.h"
- #include "coretypes.h"
- #include "hosthooks.h"
- #include "hosthooks-def.h"
- /* Linux has a feature called exec-shield-randomize that perturbs the
- address of non-fixed mapped segments by a (relatively) small amount.
- The feature is intended to make it harder to attack the system with
- buffer overflow attacks, since every invocation of a program will
- have its libraries and data segments at slightly different addresses.
- This feature causes us problems with PCH because it makes it that
- much harder to acquire a stable location at which to map our PCH
- data file.
- [ The feature causes other points of non-determinism within the
- compiler as well, so we'd *really* like to be able to have the
- driver disable exec-shield-randomize for the process group, but
- that isn't possible at present. ]
- We're going to try several things:
- * Select an architecture specific address as "likely" and see
- if that's free. For our 64-bit hosts, we can easily choose
- an address in Never Never Land.
- * If exec-shield-randomize is disabled, then just use the
- address chosen by mmap in step one.
- * If exec-shield-randomize is enabled, then temporarily allocate
- 32M of memory as a buffer, then allocate PCH memory, then
- free the buffer. The theory here is that the perturbation is
- no more than 16M, and so by allocating our buffer larger than
- that we make it considerably more likely that the address will
- be free when we want to load the data back.
- */
- #undef HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_GET_ADDRESS
- #define HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_GET_ADDRESS linux_gt_pch_get_address
- #undef HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_USE_ADDRESS
- #define HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_USE_ADDRESS linux_gt_pch_use_address
- /* For various ports, try to guess a fixed spot in the vm space
- that's probably free. */
- #if defined(__alpha)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x10000000000
- #elif defined(__ia64)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x2000000100000000
- #elif defined(__x86_64) && defined(__LP64__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x1000000000
- #elif defined(__x86_64)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
- #elif defined(__i386)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
- #elif defined(__powerpc__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
- #elif defined(__s390x__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x8000000000
- #elif defined(__s390__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
- #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__LP64__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x8000000000
- #elif defined(__sparc__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
- #elif defined(__mc68000__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x40000000
- #elif defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__ILP32__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
- #elif defined(__aarch64__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x1000000000
- #elif defined(__ARM_EABI__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
- #elif defined(__mips__) && defined(__LP64__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x8000000000
- #elif defined(__mips__)
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
- #else
- # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0
- #endif
- /* Determine a location where we might be able to reliably allocate SIZE
- bytes. FD is the PCH file, though we should return with the file
- unmapped. */
- static void *
- linux_gt_pch_get_address (size_t size, int fd)
- {
- size_t buffer_size = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
- void *addr, *buffer;
- FILE *f;
- bool randomize_on;
- addr = mmap ((void *)TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
- /* If we failed the map, that means there's *no* free space. */
- if (addr == (void *) MAP_FAILED)
- return NULL;
- /* Unmap the area before returning. */
- munmap (addr, size);
- /* If we got the exact area we requested, then that's great. */
- if (TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE && addr == (void *) TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE)
- return addr;
- /* If we didn't, then we need to look to see if virtual address
- randomization is on. That is recorded in
- kernel.randomize_va_space. An older implementation used
- kernel.exec-shield-randomize. */
- f = fopen ("/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space", "r");
- if (f == NULL)
- f = fopen ("/proc/sys/kernel/exec-shield-randomize", "r");
- randomize_on = false;
- if (f != NULL)
- {
- char buf[100];
- size_t c;
- c = fread (buf, 1, sizeof buf - 1, f);
- if (c > 0)
- {
- buf[c] = '\0';
- randomize_on = (atoi (buf) > 0);
- }
- fclose (f);
- }
- /* If it isn't, then accept the address that mmap selected as fine. */
- if (!randomize_on)
- return addr;
- /* Otherwise, we need to try again with buffer space. */
- buffer = mmap (0, buffer_size, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
- addr = mmap (0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
- if (buffer != (void *) MAP_FAILED)
- munmap (buffer, buffer_size);
- if (addr == (void *) MAP_FAILED)
- return NULL;
- munmap (addr, size);
- return addr;
- }
- /* Map SIZE bytes of FD+OFFSET at BASE. Return 1 if we succeeded at
- mapping the data at BASE, -1 if we couldn't.
- It's not possibly to reliably mmap a file using MAP_PRIVATE to
- a specific START address on either hpux or linux. First we see
- if mmap with MAP_PRIVATE works. If it does, we are off to the
- races. If it doesn't, we try an anonymous private mmap since the
- kernel is more likely to honor the BASE address in anonymous maps.
- We then copy the data to the anonymous private map. This assumes
- of course that we don't need to change the data in the PCH file
- after it is created.
- This approach obviously causes a performance penalty but there is
- little else we can do given the current PCH implementation. */
- static int
- linux_gt_pch_use_address (void *base, size_t size, int fd, size_t offset)
- {
- void *addr;
- /* We're called with size == 0 if we're not planning to load a PCH
- file at all. This allows the hook to free any static space that
- we might have allocated at link time. */
- if (size == 0)
- return -1;
- /* Try to map the file with MAP_PRIVATE. */
- addr = mmap (base, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, offset);
- if (addr == base)
- return 1;
- if (addr != (void *) MAP_FAILED)
- munmap (addr, size);
- /* Try to make an anonymous private mmap at the desired location. */
- addr = mmap (base, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
- if (addr != base)
- {
- if (addr != (void *) MAP_FAILED)
- munmap (addr, size);
- return -1;
- }
- if (lseek (fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1)
- return -1;
- while (size)
- {
- ssize_t nbytes;
- nbytes = read (fd, base, MIN (size, (size_t)-1 >> 1));
- if (nbytes <= 0)
- return -1;
- base = (char *) base + nbytes;
- size -= nbytes;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- const struct host_hooks host_hooks = HOST_HOOKS_INITIALIZER;
|