main/network/misc/libproxy/files/libproxy-0.4.15-fix-CVE-2020-25219.patch

From a83dae404feac517695c23ff43ce1e116e2bfbe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@gnome.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 11:12:02 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite url::recvline to be nonrecursive

This function processes network input. It's semi-trusted, because the
PAC ought to be trusted. But we still shouldn't allow it to control how
far we recurse. A malicious PAC can cause us to overflow the stack by
sending a sufficiently-long line without any '\n' character.

Also, this function failed to properly handle EINTR, so let's fix that
too, for good measure.

Fixes #134
---
 libproxy/url.cpp | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp
index ee776b2..68d69cd 100644
--- a/libproxy/url.cpp
+++ b/libproxy/url.cpp
@@ -388,16 +388,24 @@ string url::to_string() const {
 	return m_orig;
 }
 
-static inline string recvline(int fd) {
-	// Read a character.
-	// If we don't get a character, return empty string.
-	// If we are at the end of the line, return empty string.
-	char c = '\0';
-	
-	if (recv(fd, &c, 1, 0) != 1 || c == '\n')
-		return "";
-
-	return string(1, c) + recvline(fd);
+static string recvline(int fd) {
+	string line;
+	int ret;
+
+	// Reserve arbitrary amount of space to avoid small memory reallocations.
+	line.reserve(128);
+
+	do {
+		char c;
+		ret = recv(fd, &c, 1, 0);
+		if (ret == 1) {
+			if (c == '\n')
+				return line;
+			line += c;
+		}
+	} while (ret == 1 || (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR));
+
+	return line;
 }
 
 char* url::get_pac() {