pgpkeys.but 11 KB

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  1. \A{pgpkeys} PuTTY download keys and signatures
  2. \I{verifying new versions}We create \i{GPG signatures} for all the PuTTY
  3. files distributed from our web site, so that users can be confident
  4. that the files have not been tampered with. Here we identify
  5. our public keys, and explain our signature policy so you can have an
  6. accurate idea of what each signature guarantees.
  7. This description is provided as both a web page on the PuTTY site, and
  8. an appendix in the PuTTY manual.
  9. As of release 0.58, all of the PuTTY executables contain fingerprint
  10. material (usually accessed via the \i\c{-pgpfp} command-line
  11. option), such that if you have an executable you trust, you can use
  12. it to establish a trust path, for instance to a newer version
  13. downloaded from the Internet.
  14. As of release 0.67, the Windows executables and installer also contain
  15. built-in signatures that are automatically verified by Windows' own
  16. mechanism (\q{\i{Authenticode}}). The keys used for that are different,
  17. and are not covered here.
  18. See \k{faq-checksums} in the FAQ for some gotchas when verifying
  19. checksums and signatures.
  20. (Note that none of the keys, signatures, etc mentioned here have
  21. anything to do with keys used with SSH - they are purely for verifying
  22. the origin of files distributed by the PuTTY team.)
  23. \H{pgpkeys-pubkey} Public keys
  24. We maintain multiple keys, stored with different levels of security
  25. due to being used in different ways. See \k{pgpkeys-security} below
  26. for details.
  27. The keys we provide are:
  28. \dt Snapshot Key
  29. \dd Used to sign routine development builds of PuTTY: nightly
  30. snapshots, pre-releases, and sometimes also custom diagnostic builds
  31. we send to particular users.
  32. \dt Release Key
  33. \dd Used to sign manually released versions of PuTTY.
  34. \dt Secure Contact Key
  35. \dd An encryption-capable key suitable for people to send confidential
  36. messages to the PuTTY team, e.g. reports of vulnerabilities.
  37. \dt Master Key
  38. \dd Used to tie all the above keys into the GPG web of trust. The
  39. Master Key signs all the other keys, and other GPG users have signed
  40. it in turn.
  41. The current issue of those keys are available for download from the
  42. PuTTY website, and are also available on PGP keyservers using the key
  43. IDs listed below.
  44. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/master-2023.asc}{\s{Master Key} (2023)}
  45. \dd RSA, 4096-bit. Key ID: \cw{B15D9EFC216B06A1}. Fingerprint:
  46. \cw{28D4\_7C46\_55E7\_65A6\_D827\_AC66\_B15D\_9EFC\_216B\_06A1}
  47. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/release-2023.asc}{\s{Release Key} (2023)}
  48. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{1993D21BCAD1AA77}. Fingerprint:
  49. \cw{F412\_BA3A\_A30F\_DC0E\_77B4\_E387\_1993\_D21B\_CAD1\_AA77}
  50. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/snapshot-2023.asc}{\s{Snapshot Key} (2023)}
  51. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{10625E553F53FAAD}. Fingerprint:
  52. \cw{74CC\_6DD9\_ABA7\_31D4\_C5A0\_C2D0\_1062\_5E55\_3F53\_FAAD}
  53. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/contact-2023.asc}{\s{Secure Contact Key} (2023)}
  54. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{1559F6A8929F5EFC}. Fingerprint:
  55. \cw{01F5\_A2B1\_1388\_D64B\_707F\_897F\_1559\_F6A8\_929F\_5EFC}
  56. \H{pgpkeys-security} Security details
  57. The various keys have various different security levels. This
  58. section explains what those security levels are, and how far you can
  59. expect to trust each key.
  60. \S{pgpkeys-snapshot} The Development Snapshots key
  61. The Development Snapshots private key is stored \e{without a
  62. passphrase}. This is necessary, because the snapshots are generated
  63. every night without human intervention, so nobody would be able to
  64. type a passphrase.
  65. The snapshots are built and signed on a team member's home computers,
  66. before being uploaded to the web server from which you download them.
  67. Therefore, a signature from the Development Snapshots key \e{DOES}
  68. protect you against:
  69. \b People tampering with the PuTTY binaries between the PuTTY web site
  70. and you.
  71. \b The maintainers of our web server attempting to abuse their root
  72. privilege to tamper with the binaries.
  73. But it \e{DOES NOT} protect you against:
  74. \b People tampering with the binaries before they are uploaded to our
  75. download servers.
  76. \b People tampering with the build machines so that the next set of
  77. binaries they build will be malicious in some way.
  78. \b People stealing the unencrypted private key from the build machine
  79. it lives on.
  80. Of course, we take all reasonable precautions to guard the build
  81. machines. But when you see a signature, you should always be certain
  82. of precisely what it guarantees and precisely what it does not.
  83. \S{pgpkeys-release} The Releases key
  84. The Releases key is more secure: because it is only used at release
  85. time, to sign each release by hand, we can store it encrypted.
  86. The Releases private key is kept encrypted on the developers' own
  87. local machines. So an attacker wanting to steal it would have to also
  88. steal the passphrase.
  89. \S{pgpkeys-contact} The Secure Contact Key
  90. The Secure Contact Key is stored with a similar level of security to
  91. the Release Key: it is stored with a passphrase, and no automated
  92. script has access to it.
  93. \S{pgpkeys-master} The Master Keys
  94. The Master Key signs almost nothing. Its purpose is to bind the other
  95. keys together and certify that they are all owned by the same people
  96. and part of the same integrated setup. The only signatures produced by
  97. the Master Key, \e{ever}, should be the signatures on the other keys.
  98. The Master Key is especially long, and its private key and passphrase
  99. are stored with special care.
  100. We have collected some third-party signatures on the Master Key, in
  101. order to increase the chances that you can find a suitable trust path
  102. to them.
  103. We have uploaded our various keys to public keyservers, so that
  104. even if you don't know any of the people who have signed our
  105. keys, you can still be reasonably confident that an attacker would
  106. find it hard to substitute fake keys on all the public keyservers at
  107. once.
  108. \H{pgpkeys-rollover} Key rollover
  109. Our current keys were generated in July 2023.
  110. Each new Master Key is signed with the old one, to show that it really
  111. is owned by the same people and not substituted by an attacker.
  112. Each new Master Key also signs the previous Release Keys, in case
  113. you're trying to verify the signatures on a release prior to the
  114. rollover and can find a chain of trust to those keys from any of the
  115. people who have signed our new Master Key.
  116. Each release is signed with the Release Key that was current at the
  117. time of release. We don't go back and re-sign old releases with newly
  118. generated keys.
  119. The details of all previous keys are given here.
  120. \s{Keys generated in the 2021 rollover}
  121. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/master-2021.asc}{\s{Master Key} (2021)}
  122. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{DD4355EAAC1119DE}. Fingerprint:
  123. \cw{A872\_D42F\_1660\_890F\_0E05\_223E\_DD43\_55EA\_AC11\_19DE}
  124. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/release-2021.asc}{\s{Release Key} (2021)}
  125. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{E4F83EA2AA4915EC}. Fingerprint:
  126. \cw{2CF6\_134B\_D3F7\_7A65\_88EB\_D668\_E4F8\_3EA2\_AA49\_15EC}
  127. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/snapshot-2021.asc}{\s{Snapshot Key} (2021)}
  128. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{B43979F89F446CFD}. Fingerprint:
  129. \cw{1FD3\_BCAC\_E532\_FBE0\_6A8C\_09E2\_B439\_79F8\_9F44\_6CFD}
  130. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/contact-2021.asc}{\s{Secure Contact Key} (2021)}
  131. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{012C59D4211BD62A}. Fingerprint:
  132. \cw{E30F\_1354\_2A04\_BE0E\_56F0\_5801\_012C\_59D4\_211B\_D62A}
  133. \s{Keys generated in the 2018 rollover}
  134. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/master-2018.asc}{\s{Master Key} (2018)}
  135. \dd RSA, 4096-bit. Key ID: \cw{76BC7FE4EBFD2D9E}. Fingerprint:
  136. \cw{24E1\_B1C5\_75EA\_3C9F\_F752\_\_A922\_76BC\_7FE4\_EBFD\_2D9E}
  137. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/release-2018.asc}{\s{Release Key} (2018)}
  138. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{6289A25F4AE8DA82}. Fingerprint:
  139. \cw{E273\_94AC\_A3F9\_D904\_9522\_\_E054\_6289\_A25F\_4AE8\_DA82}
  140. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/snapshot-2018.asc}{\s{Snapshot Key} (2018)}
  141. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{38BA7229B7588FD1}. Fingerprint:
  142. \cw{C92B\_52E9\_9AB6\_1DDA\_33DB\_\_2B7A\_38BA\_7229\_B758\_8FD1}
  143. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/contact-2018.asc}{\s{Secure Contact Key} (2018)}
  144. \dd RSA, 3072-bit. Key ID: \cw{657D487977F95C98}. Fingerprint:
  145. \cw{A680\_0082\_2998\_6E46\_22CA\_\_0E43\_657D\_4879\_77F9\_5C98}
  146. \s{Key generated in 2016} (when we first introduced the Secure Contact Key)
  147. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/contact-2016.asc}{\s{Secure Contact Key} (2016)}
  148. \dd RSA, 2048-bit. Main key ID: \cw{2048R/8A0AF00B} (long version:
  149. \cw{2048R/C4FCAAD08A0AF00B}). Encryption subkey ID:
  150. \cw{2048R/50C2CF5C} (long version: \cw{2048R/9EB39CC150C2CF5C}).
  151. Fingerprint:
  152. \cw{8A26\_250E\_763F\_E359\_75F3\_\_118F\_C4FC\_AAD0\_8A0A\_F00B}
  153. \s{Keys generated in the 2015 rollover}
  154. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/master-2015.asc}{\s{Master Key} (2015)}
  155. \dd RSA, 4096-bit. Key ID: \cw{4096R/04676F7C} (long version:
  156. \cw{4096R/AB585DC604676F7C}). Fingerprint:
  157. \cw{440D\_E3B5\_B7A1\_CA85\_B3CC\_\_1718\_AB58\_5DC6\_0467\_6F7C}
  158. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/release-2015.asc}{\s{Release Key} (2015)}
  159. \dd RSA, 2048-bit. Key ID: \cw{2048R/B43434E4} (long version:
  160. \cw{2048R/9DFE2648B43434E4}). Fingerprint:
  161. \cw{0054\_DDAA\_8ADA\_15D2\_768A\_\_6DE7\_9DFE\_2648\_B434\_34E4}
  162. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/snapshot-2015.asc}{\s{Snapshot Key} (2015)}
  163. \dd RSA, 2048-bit. Key ID: \cw{2048R/D15F7E8A} (long version:
  164. \cw{2048R/EEF20295D15F7E8A}). Fingerprint:
  165. \cw{0A3B\_0048\_FE49\_9B67\_A234\_\_FEB6\_EEF2\_0295\_D15F\_7E8A}
  166. \s{Original keys generated in 2000} (two sets, RSA and DSA)
  167. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/master-rsa.asc}{\s{Master Key} (original RSA)}
  168. \dd RSA, 1024-bit. Key ID: \cw{1024R/1E34AC41} (long version:
  169. \cw{1024R/9D5877BF1E34AC41}). Fingerprint:
  170. \cw{8F\_15\_97\_DA\_25\_30\_AB\_0D\_\_88\_D1\_92\_54\_11\_CF\_0C\_4C}
  171. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/master-dsa.asc}{\s{Master Key} (original DSA)}
  172. \dd DSA, 1024-bit. Key ID: \cw{1024D/6A93B34E} (long version:
  173. \cw{1024D/4F5E6DF56A93B34E}). Fingerprint:
  174. \cw{313C\_3E76\_4B74\_C2C5\_F2AE\_\_83A8\_4F5E\_6DF5\_6A93\_B34E}
  175. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/release-rsa.asc}{\s{Release Key} (original RSA)}
  176. \dd RSA, 1024-bit. Key ID: \cw{1024R/B41CAE29} (long version:
  177. \cw{1024R/EF39CCC0B41CAE29}). Fingerprint:
  178. \cw{AE\_65\_D3\_F7\_85\_D3\_18\_E0\_\_3B\_0C\_9B\_02\_FF\_3A\_81\_FE}
  179. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/release-dsa.asc}{\s{Release Key} (original DSA)}
  180. \dd DSA, 1024-bit. Key ID: \cw{1024D/08B0A90B} (long version:
  181. \cw{1024D/FECD6F3F08B0A90B}). Fingerprint:
  182. \cw{00B1\_1009\_38E6\_9800\_6518\_\_F0AB\_FECD\_6F3F\_08B0\_A90B}
  183. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/snapshot-rsa.asc}{\s{Snapshot Key} (original RSA)}
  184. \dd RSA, 1024-bit. Key ID: \cw{1024R/32B903A9} (long version:
  185. \cw{1024R/FAAED21532B903A9}). Fingerprint:
  186. \cw{86\_8B\_1F\_79\_9C\_F4\_7F\_BD\_\_8B\_1B\_D7\_8E\_C6\_4E\_4C\_03}
  187. \dt \W{https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/keys/snapshot-dsa.asc}{\s{Snapshot Key} (original DSA)}
  188. \dd DSA, 1024-bit. Key ID: \cw{1024D/7D3E4A00} (long version:
  189. \cw{1024D/165E56F77D3E4A00}). Fingerprint:
  190. \cw{63DD\_8EF8\_32F5\_D777\_9FF0\_\_2947\_165E\_56F7\_7D3E\_4A00}